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NOTES
Employment Law: Congress Giveth and the Supreme Court
Taketh Away: Title VII's Prohibition of Religious
Discrimination in the Workplace*
I. Introduction
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' (Title VII) prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.2
Specifically, with respect to religion, Title VII bars overt employment
discrimination based on employees' religious beliefs or practices.3 Congress
broadened the scope of Title Vil's protections with a 1972 amendment that
requires employers to make reasonable accommodations for an employee's
religious practices when a facially neutral employment practice has a disparate
impact on an employee's religious beliefs or practices.4 No reasonable
accommodation is required, however, if the employer would suffer undue
hardship as a result of such accommodation.' Because Congress failed to
define "reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship," there is no
coherent and consistent framework addressing an employer's duty to
accommodate minority religious beliefs under Title VII.
Congress intended Title VII to allow individuals to express their religious
beliefs freely without being hindered by otherwise facially neutral
employment practices.6 Congress promulgated Title VII not only to prohibit
overt religious discrimination, but also to remove impediments caused by
neutral regulations that disproportionately impact adherents of minority
religions.7 Courts, however, have effectively limited the scope of protection
by finding an undue hardship when anything more than minimal effort or cost
* Winner, Frank C. Love Memorial Scholarship.
I would like to dedicate this work to my parents, Muhammad and Nargis Yasin, and my
husband, Tariq Yunus, for their endless love, support, and encouragement. Additionally, I
would like to thank Courtney Zaghari-Mask for inspiring me to explore the area of employment
discrimination.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103, 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(j)).
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
7. See, e.g., id.
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to the employer would be necessary to accommodate the employee's religious
beliefs.8 Consequently, this narrow interpretation of undue hardship has made
it exceptionally difficult for employees to prevail on religious discrimination
claims.9
This note addresses the problems inherent in the current judicial
interpretation of Title VH's religious accommodation provision, specifically
regarding religious dress and grooming. Moreover, this note argues that the
current interpretation of reasonable accommodation and undue hardship
abrogates Title VII of any substantive standards that would ensure employees'
religious beliefs and practices are reasonably accommodated. Accordingly,
the manner in which courts currently interpret Title VH opposes congressional
intent, making employers' burden of accommodation devoid of any real
meaning or impact.1° For Title VII's religious safeguards to be effective,
courts must revisit the employer's burden of accommodation and interpret the
duty to accommodate in a manner that not only would be consistent with
congressional intent, but also would have a tangible substantive effect by
creating a more religiously expressive workplace.
Part II of this note examines Title VII's history and the case that led to
Congress's adoption of the reasonable accommodation and undue hardship
amendment. This part also discusses how the U.S. Supreme Court has
narrowly construed the reasonable accommodation provision in two landmark
cases involving employment discrimination based on religious beliefs. Part
III evaluates how courts inconsistently apply both the reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship provisions of Title VH by analyzing five
different categories ofjudicial interpretation. Furthermore, this part examines
various policy debates, including the disparate impact doctrine, the extent to
which private employers should alter otherwise neutral employment practices
to accommodate some employees' religious beliefs, as well as the need to
maintain the appearance of religious neutrality in the context of public
employment. Finally, Part I1 develops and analyzes an alternative model of
interpretation that courts should employ to effectuate a more coherent and
consistent analysis for determining reasonable accommodation and undue
hardship in employment discrimination cases.
8. See, e.g., Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986); Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
9. Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious
Accommodation Provision To Redeem Title VII, 76 Tx. L. REV. 317, 386 (1997).
10. See, e.g., Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60; Hardison, 432 U.S. 63.
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II. Title VII
A. Background
Congress designed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit discrimination
against minority groups in the United States with respect to both personal and
political rights." As originally enacted, Title VII failed to include any
provision that required employers to take affirmative steps to accommodate
the religious beliefs of their employees in situations where a facially neutral
employment regulation conflicted with an employee's religious beliefs.
2
Accordingly, because Congress did not address this issue, courts had to
determine the question of whether Title VII conferred an affirmative duty on
employers to reasonably accommodate their employees' religious beliefs. 3
In Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.,14 a divided Supreme Court failed to resolve
the issue, leaving the future of employers' duty to accommodate unclear. 5
1. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.
In Dewey, the Supreme Court faced the decision of whether an employer
has a duty to accommodate the private religious beliefs of an employee when
an employment regulation directly conflicts with the employee's religious
11. Sara L. Silbiger, Heaven Can Wait: Judicial Interpretation of Title Vil's Religious
Accommodation Requirement Since Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 53 FORDHAM L. REV.
839, 839 (1985). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act specifically addresses employment
discrimination by providing that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). The scope of Title VII is limited to employers with fifteen or
more employees. Id.
12. Debbie N. Kaminer, Title Vii's Failure To Provide Meaningful and Consistent
Protection of Religious Employees: Proposalsforan Amendment, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 575, 580 (2000).
13. Id.
14. 402 U.S. 689 (1971) (per curiam) (Dewey 1).
15. Id. at 689.
2004]
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beliefs. 16 In a 4-4 per curiam decision, 17 the Court affirmed the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, holding that employers have no affirmative duty
to accommodate employees' religious beliefs when such beliefs conflict with
a facially neutral employment regulation. 18 The Court did not provide an
analytical framework or reasoning for its conclusion; rather, the entire text of
the opinion merely stated that "[t]he judgment is affirmed by an equally
divided Court."' 9 Because the Court failed to provide any rationale for its
decision, the Sixth Circuit's opinion provides the only established legal
precedent on the issue of employers' duty to accommodate.2 °
In Dewey, Reynolds Metals Company and the United Auto Workers Union
entered into a collective bargaining agreement and negotiated mandatory
overtime shifts for all employees of Reynolds.2' Robert Dewey, a member of
the Faith Reformed Church and an employee of Reynolds, refused to work
mandatory overtime shifts on Sunday because of his religious objections to
working on the Sabbath.22 Initially, Reynolds reprimanded Dewey, telling him
that if he did not work on Sundays, he would have to find a replacement.23
Although Dewey initially provided a replacement to work his shift for an
eight-month period, he later refused to either work or seek a replacement,
claiming that both actions violated his religious beliefs.24 Despite Dewey's
bona fide religious belief that conflicted with Reynolds's employment
practice, Reynolds subsequently discharged Dewey because of his failure to
abide by its mandatory overtime requirement.2"
The Sixth Circuit determined that Reynolds did not unlawfully discriminate
against Dewey, stating that to "accede to Dewey's demands would require
Reynolds to discriminate against its other employees by requiring them to
work on Sundays in the place of Dewey, thereby relieving Dewey of his
contractual obligation. This would constitute unequal administration of the
collective bargaining agreement among the employees .... "26 The appellate
court essentially found that a facially neutral employment practice that has a
disparate impact on some employees' religious beliefs does not require any
16. Id.
17. Id. Justice Harlan did not take any part in the consideration or decision of the case.
18. Id.; see also Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 330 (6th Cir. 1970) (Dewey
II).
19. Dewey 1, 402 U.S. at 689.
20. Id.; see also Dewey H, 429 F.2d at 300.
21. Dewey 1I, 429 F.2d at 328-29.
22. Id. at 329.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 330.
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accommodation under Title VII. 2 7 Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit held that
providing such accommodation results in reverse discrimination against those
employees who do not harbor such religious beliefs.28 Moreover, and perhaps
more upsetting, the court blatantly rejected the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) guidelines requiring reasonable accom-
modation of an employee's religious beliefs.29 In doing so, the court stated:
The requirement of accommodation to religious beliefs is
contained only in the EEOC Regulations, which in our judgment
are not consistent with the Act. .... To construe the Act as
authorizing the adoption of Regulations which would coerce or
compel an employer to accede to or accommodate the religious
beliefs of all of his employees would raise grave constitutional
questions of violation of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.... The employer ought not to be forced to accommo-
date each of the varying religious beliefs and practices of his
employees.3"
Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit's holding and the Supreme Court's per curiam
decision substantially limited the significance of Title VIl's prohibition of
employment discrimination based on religious beliefs. Dewey, however,
served as an impetus for an amendment to Title VII, which placed an
affirmative duty of accommodation on employers when an otherwise neutral
employment regulation may affect a religious minority, rather than a mere
prohibition against overt discrimination by an employer. 3
2. Congress Tries Again: The Section 701(j) Amendment Requiring
Accommodation
In an effort to broaden the scope of protection against religious
discrimination, Congress amended Title VII, stating that "[t]he term 'religion'
includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief,
unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate
to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business. 32 The
amendment places an affirmative duty to accommodate on employers, absent
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 334-35.
30. Id.
31. Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2,86 Stat. 103, 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)
(2000)).
32. Id. (emphasis added).
2004]
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undue hardship, and effectively broadens the scope of "religion" to include
nontraditional practices.33 Accordingly, the amendment does not require
individuals to belong to an established religious group, so long as they
sincerely hold their moral or ethical beliefs with the strength of traditional
religious views.34
Courts have since interpreted religion in accordance with the language of
the amendment, which is significant because Title VII requires plaintiffs to
demonstrate that they hold a sincere religious belief to establish a prima facie
case of religious discrimination.35 Despite courts' broad interpretation of
religion, employees must overcome a narrow interpretation of reasonable
accommodation to successfully litigate a claim of religious discrimination
under Title VII.
B. Establishing a Prima Facie Case of Religious Discrimination After the
Section 701(j) Amendment
For employees to establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination
under Title VH, they must prove that: (1) they have a bona fide belief that
compliance with an employment requirement is contrary to their religious
faith or beliefs; (2) they have informed their employer about this conflict; and
(3) the employer discharged or disciplined them as a direct result of their
refusal to comply with the conflicting employment requirement.36 Once the
employee satisfies this burden, employers must show that they attempted to
reasonably accommodate the employee's religious practices, unless the
employer can successfully prove that the accommodation would cause them
undue hardship.37
The greatest hurdle for employees bringing Title VII actions is the
judiciary's narrow reading of the reasonable accommodation requirement and
its correspondingly broad reading of what constitutes an undue hardship.38
Generally, employees prevail in Title VI religious discrimination cases only
when employers have made absolutely no attempt to reasonably accommodate
employees, and employers can make no legitimate showing of undue
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965) ("[Tlhe test of belief
'in a relation to a Supreme Being' is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful
occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God
of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption. Where such beliefs have parallel positions in the
lives of their respective holders we cannot say that one is 'in a relation to a Supreme Being' and
the other is not.").
35. Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382, 1383 (9th Cir. 1984).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
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hardship.39  As a practical matter, almost any type of employer
accommodation is sufficient to uphold the employer's duty to reasonably
accommodate under Title VII.
40
C. The Confusion Continues: The Supreme Court's Refusal to Give
Substantive Meaning to Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship
In two important cases, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the extent of
employers' obligations to reasonably accommodate under section 7010).
Both cases provided a narrow interpretation at odds with the fundamental
purpose of the amendment. Ultimately, the Court failed to place any
significant legal obligations on employers to accommodate their employees'
religious beliefs.4'
1. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison
In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,42 the Supreme Court had the
opportunity to interpret employers' responsibilities and duties under Title VII.
Specifically, the Court addressed the extent to which employers are required
to reasonably accommodate employees' religious beliefs after section 701(j).4"
The Court chose to severely limit the amendment's scope and protection by
interpreting section 7010) so narrowly as to clearly conflict with the
amendment's original purpose."
In that case, Larry Hardison, a member of the Worldwide Church of God,
refused to work on the Sabbath, which lasted from sunset on Friday to sunset
on Saturday. After informing TWA of his religious beliefs, Hardison agreed
to work traditional holidays in exchange for not working on the Sabbath.45
When Hardison transferred to a different building, however, his seniority fell
to second-from-the-bottom of the list.46 After a fellow employee went on
vacation, TWA assigned Hardison to work shifts that interfered with his
observation of the Sabbath.4 7 As a compromise, Hardison proposed that he
only work four days a week so that he could still observe the Sabbath.4 8 TWA
39. Engle, supra note 9, at 388.
40. Id.
41. See id.
42. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
43. Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2,86 Stat. 103, 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)
(2000)).
44. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 87 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 67-68. Traditional holidays would include Thanksgiving, Christmas, New Year's
Day, etc. Hardison's seniority was also a factor in reaching this arrangement. Id.
46. Id. at 68.
47. Id.
48. Id.
2004]
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rejected this proposal and eventually fired Hardison for insubordination when
he refused to report for work on the Sabbath.49
In analyzing the extent to which TWA had complied with its statutory duty
to accommodate Hardison, the Supreme Court noted that Congress had failed
to provide sufficient guidelines for the Court to determine the level of
accommodation required of an employer.50 The Court clearly acknowledged,
however, that Congress enacted the amendment in response to Dewey and
Riley v. Bendix Corp.,5' both of which involved employees who refused to
work on their Sabbath and who were subsequently discharged.52 The Court
stated, "It is clear from the language of § 7010) that Congress intended to
change this result53 by requiring some form of accommodation; but this tells
us nothing about how much an employer must do to satisfy its statutory
obligation."54 After noting the absence of a direct congressional mandate, the
Court limited the amendment to the extent that it became meaningless,
holding that requiring TWA to incur more than a de minimis cost to
accommodate the religious beliefs of Hardison constituted an undue
hardship.5 5  Moreover, the Court determined that when a proposed
accommodation will negatively affect other employees, this effect standing
alone is sufficient to cause undue hardship to the employer.56 Specifically, the
Court stated that it would "not readily construe [Title VII] to require an
employer to discriminate against some employees in order to enable others to
observe their Sabbath. 57
The Court's refusal to interpret section 7010) with any substantive effect
stemmed from its concern that by enacting Title VII, Congress had attempted
to prevent discrimination in all forms. 58 The Court reasoned that requiring a
high degree of accommodation would ultimately lead to disparate treatment
49. Id. at 68-69.
50. Id. at 74.
51. 330 F. Supp. 583 (M.D. Fla. 1971), rev'd, 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972).
52. In both Dewey and Riley, employees were discharged because of their religious belief
that they could not work on the Sabbath. Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the District Court
of Florida held that the application of a facially neutral law, absent overt discrimination, did not
constitute religious discrimination under Title VII. Furthermore, there was no requirement for
the employer to accommodate the beliefs of the employee.
53. "This result" refers to the decisions of Dewey and Riley, which both held that the
employer had no affirmative duty to accommodate. See generally Dewey v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 402 U.S. 689 (1971) (Dewey 1); Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 243 (6th Cir.
1970) (Dewey II); Riley, 330 F. Supp. 583.
54. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 74 n.9.
55. Id. at 84.
56. Id. at 85.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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of religions, or reverse discrimination against other religions, which
undermined the very purpose of the statute by treating employees, who were
otherwise similarly situated, differently based on religion alone. 9
Justice Marshall vigorously attacked this reasoning in a compelling
dissenting opinion.' As he poignantly stated, "[If an accommodation can be
rejected simply because it involves preferential treatment, then the regulation
and the statute, while brimming with sound and fury, ultimately signify
nothing."61  Furthermore, Justice Marshall argued that reasonable
accommodation mandates unequal treatment to the extent that it does not
impose an undue burden upon employers.62 This analysis is persuasive
because the accommodation issue only arises in instances where a facially
neutral employment regulation applies to all employees, but the regulation
disparately affects some employees because of their religious beliefs.63
Accordingly, as Justice Marshall stated, proper analysis of a religious
discrimination claim would require courts to engage in balancing reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship to allow employees to practice their
religious beliefs and continue their employment, so long as the burden is not
undue.'
The text of Title VII and section 701(j) requires employers in some
instances to provide different, and at times even preferential, treatment to
employees when necessary to accommodate their religious beliefs or
practices. 5 The very essence of Title VII requires a balancing test that
considers two competing interests: the religious beliefs of employees and the
cost and burden inherent in the employers' duty of accommodation.66
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Hardison, courts have been
reluctant to actually analyze the factual allegations and apply a balancing test
to these countervailing interests.67 Rather, courts often find neutral
59. Id. at 81. The Court stated, "Title VII does not contemplate such unequal treatment.
The repeated, unequivocal emphasis of both the language and the legislative history of Title VII
is on eliminating discrimination in employment, and such discrimination is proscribed when it
is directed against majorities as well as minorities." Id.
60. Id. at 85 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated, "[A]s a matter of law
today's result is intolerable, for the Court adopts the very position that Congress expressly
rejected in 1972, as if we were free to disregard congressional choices that a majority of this
Court thinks unwise." Id. at 87.
61. Id. at 87 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (internal quotations and alterations omitted).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Engle, supra note 9, at 387.
66. Id.
67. Id.
2004]
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employment regulations nondiscriminatory even when the regulations
disparately affect employees with certain religious beliefs, and do not require
employers to accommodate religious minorities for fear that doing so would
cause employers to discriminate against other employees.68 As such, courts
have generally accepted any minimal showing of hardship by employers as
sufficient to sustain their burden of showing an undue hardship, effectively
limiting both the scope and effect of Title VII and section 7010).
69
2. Third Time Is Not a Charm: EEOC Guidelines to the Section 701(j)
Amendment
In 1980, the EEOC published the Guidelines on Discrimination Because
of Religion in an effort to clarify employers' responsibilities to reasonably
accommodate employees' religious practices. 7' The EEOC guidelines
outlined an employer's duty to accommodate once an individual notifies the
employer of a need for accommodation.71 Under the guidelines, employers
must consider all available alternatives for accommodating the religious
practices of the individual.72 Moreover, when there is "more than one means
of accommodation which would not cause undue hardship, the
employer ...must offer the alternative which least disadvantages the
individual with respect to his or her employment opportunities."73
Clearly, the EEOC promulgated the EEOC guidelines to require a much
higher degree of accommodation than was required in Hardison.74 For
instance, the guidelines require employers to evaluate all available options in
determining how to reasonably accommodate employees, and when multiple
alternatives exist, employers must provide the accommodation which least
disadvantages the individual in their employment opportunities.75 The
guidelines contrasted significantly with Hardison, in that the Court in
Hardison merely required that the employer show any de minimis
hypothetical hardship, which would constitute undue hardship and alleviate
an employer's duty to accommodate.76
Although the EEOC guidelines attempted to clarify employers'
responsibilities respecting reasonable accommodation, the EEOC failed to
68. Id. at 388.
69. Id.
70. 29 C.F.R. § 1605 (2003).
71. Id. § 1605.2(c)(1).
72. Id.
73. Id. § 1605.2(c)(2)(ii) (emphasis added).
74. See id. § 1605.2(e).
75. Id. § 1605.2(c)(2)(ii).
76. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
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delineate what constitutes an "undue hardship."" The guidelines state that
"[tihe Commission will determine what constitutes 'more than a de minimis
cost' with due regard given to the identifiable cost in relation to the size and
operating cost of the employer, and the number of individuals who will in fact
need a particular accommodation."78 Even though the guidelines established
some rudimentary factors to help determine whether an undue hardship would
result from a particular accommodation, the EEOC clearly failed to reduce the
amount of judicial discretion applied in religious discrimination cases.
Moreover, the EEOC guidelines did not provide a coherent analytical
framework to guide employer-employee relations with respect to religious
accommodation.79 Although the EEOC promulgated the guidelines to
strengthen employees' rights under Title VII, the EEOC's failure to provide
adequate guidance regarding what constitutes an undue burden has allowed
the Court to continue to interpret employers' obligations too narrowly.
3. Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook
In 1986, six years after the EEOC passed the guidelines, the U.S. Supreme
Court once again had the opportunity to determine what reasonable
accommodation required of employers in Ansonia Board of Education v.
Philbrook.80 The Ansonia Board of Education employed Ronald Philbrook,
a member of the Worldwide Church of God, as a high school teacher.81
Philbrook' s religious beliefs required him to refrain from secular employment
during religious holidays, leading him to miss approximately six days of work
each year.82 The terms of the collective bargaining agreement that governed
Philbrook's employment with the school district limited paid leave for
religious holidays to three days.83 The agreement also allotted three days of
accumulated paid leave for personal reasons.84 Teachers could not, however,
use personal days for any purpose for which a designated leave was already
provided, including leave for religious holidays.85 Consequently, the
collective bargaining agreement limited Philbrook to three days of religious
leave; beyond this, Philbrook's only options were to either take an unpaid
77. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e).
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. 479 U.S. 60 (1986).
81. Id. at62.
82. Id. at 62-63.
83. Id. at 63-64.
84. Id. at 64.
85. Id.
20041
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leave of absence to observe additional religious holidays or work on his
religious holiday.86
Dissatisfied with this arrangement, Philbrook requested that the school
board adopt one of two alternatives.87 First, he suggested that he be allowed
to use his allotted personal days for religious observances. Such an
accommodation would have essentially provided Philbrook three additional
days of paid leave specifically for religious holidays.88 As a second option,
Philbrook volunteered to pay the costs of employing a substitute during his
religious holidays if he received full pay for the additional days off.89 When
the school board refused both accommodations, Philbrook filed a complaint
alleging religious discrimination in violation of Title VIIY°
In addressing the school district's reasonable accommodation obligation in
light of the 1980 EEOC guidelines, the Court held that there was no basis "in
either the statute or its legislative history [requiring] an employer to choose
any particular reasonable accommodation. By its very terms the statute
directs that any reasonable accommodation by the employer is sufficient to
meet its accommodation obligation.'"91 By directly contradicting the
guidelines, the Court significantly undermined the guidelines' legitimacy.
Specifically, the Court stated that "[t]o the extent that the
guideline.., requires the employer to accept any alternative favored by the
employee short of undue hardship, we find the guideline simply inconsistent
with the plain meaning of the statute. 92 Ultimately, the Court failed to use
the EEOC guidelines at all in its analysis of whether the school board had
attempted to reasonably accommodate Philbrook.93
In his dissent, Justice Marshall admonished the Court for its selective
reading of the EEOC guidelines.94 Justice Marshall reminded the Court that
only a year earlier, it had expressly relied on an EEOC guideline in a sexual
harassment case arising under Title VII.9 He further argued that the Court's
refusal to use the EEOC guidelines in its analysis was based on a "selective
reading."96 Ultimately, the Court effectively invalidated Congress's and the
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 64-65.
89. Id. at 65.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 68.
92. Id. at 69-70 n.6.
93. Id.
94. See Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(b)(1)
(2003).
95. Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 73-74 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
96. Id. at 74 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Marshall stated
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EEOC's attempts to give substantive meaning to the reasonable
accommodation provision of Title VII by persisting in a narrow reading of the
statute in Philbrook.97 Because of the Court's narrow interpretation of the
reasonable accommodation provision in section 701(j), which undeniably
flouts congressional intent, there is no consistent framework of judicial
analysis in Title VII religious discrimination cases.
III. Analysis: Five Categories of Reasonable
Accommodation Interpretation
Title VII cases reveal five basic frameworks for analyzing the reasonable
accommodation provision.9" Implicit in each of these methods is a different
set of policy goals and interests that courts must consider in deciding cases. 99
In fact, the variety of outcomes in Title VII cases reflects each "individual
court's theoretical assumptions about the interests to be balanced."'" The
five frameworks confront issues regarding: (1) public health and safety
regulations;' °' (2) overt religious discrimination by employers;0 2 (3)
nonconformists failing to abide by generally applicable neutral employment
regulations; 0 3 (4) religious accommodation balanced with public employment
and the need to appear religiously neutral;" and (5) religious interests
balanced with business necessity.'0 5 Each framework has its own theoretical
underpinnings and policy goals that courts consider in making their
decisions. °6
that the "Court's reluctance to accord similar weight to the EEOC's interpretation here rests on
nothing more than a selective reading of the express provisions of Title VII and the guidelines."
Id.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Silbiger, supra note 11, at 848 (discussing three approaches).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 849.
101. Id. at 848.
102. See Carter v. Bruce Oakley, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Ark. 1993).
103. Silbiger, supra note 11, at 849.
104. See United States v. Bd. of Educ., 911 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1990) (Bd. of Educ. 1).
105. Silbiger, supra note 11, at 849.
106. Adopting the religious interests balanced with business necessity framework is one of
the changes that courts should implement to ensure consistent Title VII interpretation. Another
significant area of deviation and inconsistency that plagues Title VII is the meaning of
reasonable accommodation. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,111-12,112 (2000). The Supreme
Court has effectively construed the exact same phrase differently in interpreting two different,
though significantly related, federal statutes - Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA). See generally id. The de minimis interpretation of reasonable accommodation has
played a crucial role in minimizing the effectiveness of Title VII, yet no similar language or
exacting standards have been imposed for construing the ADA. Id. This discrepancy exists
2004]
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A. Public Health and Safety Regulations
The most consistent application of Title Vi's religious accommodation
provision falls under the broad category of public health and safety
regulations.' Generally, when employers would be required to breach a
health or safety regulation, regardless of whether it is a self-imposed business
regulation, they are not required to accommodate the religious beliefs of
employees because compelling accommodation in such a scenario would
constitute an undue hardship.10 8 Accordingly, plaintiffs who bring Title VII
claims are unlikely to be victorious when the employer's reason for denying
the requested accommodation is the need to comply with state laws and
regulations, or when such an accommodation would pose serious health and
safety risks."' Therefore, as a general rule, employers do not have a duty to
accommodate their employees' bona fide religious-based objections to their
because the ADA explicitly defines the undue hardship standard to require "significant difficulty
or expense." Id. § 12,111(10)(A). Interestingly, the purposes of Title VII and the ADA are
parallel, in that they both are aimed at eliminating employment discrimination. See, e.g., Dawn
V. Martin, Symposium: The Americans With Disabilities Act - Introductory Comments, 8 J.L.
& HEALTH 1, 6 (1993/1994).
In fact, the ADA was modeled after both the language and concepts articulated in Title VII.
Id. The ADA provides that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual
with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(a).
The ADA also includes a reasonable accommodation provision similar to Title VII's, which
emphasizes that discrimination includes "not making reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an
applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business . I..." d  § 12,112(b)(5)(A).
Unlike Title VII, the Supreme Court has not minimized the impact of the ADA's reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship provisions because of the specific language of the statute
that requires a "significant difficulty or expense." Id. § 12,11 1(10)(A). For Title VII to truly
eradicate employment discrimination based on religion, Congress should consider amending the
current statute to mirror the ADA provision.
107. Silbiger, supra note 11, at 849.
108. See, e.g., Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382, 1384 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding
that the defendant was not liable for religious discrimination when operating in a manner
consistent with California Occupational Safety and Health Administration standards); Kalsi v.
N.Y. City Transit Auth., 62 F. Supp. 2d 745, 756 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that the plaintiff,
a Sikh, was unsuccessful when claiming religious discrimination under Title VII after being
fired for failing to wear a hard hat as required by a safety regulation in a subway maintenance
shop); EEOC v. Sambo's, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86,91 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (stating that the restaurant
was not required by Title VII to violate its own uniform grooming policy in employing the
plaintiff where hygiene was very important to the restaurant business).
109. See Silbiger, supra note 11, at 848.
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employers' hygiene, grooming, or dress requirements when providing such an
accommodation could violate a reasonable health or safety measure
promulgated by the employer or the state. 10 The business necessity, in these
cases, is to comply with health and safety regulations or be subject to
potential criminal or civil penalties. 1 ' Various cases illustrate how courts
have applied this framework.
In EEOC v. Sambo's Inc.,"' an employee who was a follower of the Sikh
religion argued that his employer's policy of prohibiting its employees from
growing beards, although not on its face discriminatory, had a disparate
impact1 13 on him because his religion prohibited him from cutting or shaving
his facial hair in the absence of a medical emergency." 4 In Sambo's, the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia held that an employer's
interest in maintaining a hygienic grooming standard constituted a business
necessity by furthering the appearance of health and sanitation; thus, any
accommodation that would cause a deviation from this regulation would
constitute an undue hardship." 5
A similar Title VII challenge arose in Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.," 6
where a follower of the Sikh faith claimed that his employer's safety policy,
which required "all employees whose duties involved potential exposure to
toxic gases to shave any facial hair that prevented them from achieving a gas-
tight face seal when wearing a respirator," constituted religious
discrimination." 7 Chevron adopted this safety regulation to comply with the
standards established by California's Occupational Safety and Health
110. Dress Codes as Religious Discrimination, EMP. DIscRIM. COORDINATOR 26,214
(2003). In these cases, the business necessity of maintaining sanitation or complying with a
public health or safety regulation fulfills the undue hardship requirement. See, e.g., Karl E.
Klare, Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26 NEwENG. L. REv. 1395, 1413
(1992) (discussing EEOC v. Sambo's, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86 (E.D. Ga. 1981)).
111. Valid business necessity does not provide an alternative analysis to undue hardship; it
merely fulfills the burden of illustrating that the proposed accommodation would create undue
hardship on the employer.
112. 530 F. Supp. 86 (E.D. Ga. 1981).
113. The Supreme Court introduced the disparate impact doctrine in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), holding that neutral employment requirements could violate Title VII
if the requirement resulted in a sufficiently disproportionate adverse impact on a member of a
minority class. Id. at 429-30. For employers to successfully defend against a disparate impact
claim, employers must show that the employment practice in question is a "business necessity."
Id. at 431.
114. Sambo 's, Inc., 530 F. Supp. at 88, 92.
115. Id. at93.
116. 734 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1984).
117. Id. at 1383.
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Administration (COSHA)." 8 Once the safety regulation took effect, Chevron
announced that it would test all employees affected by the policy to guarantee
that they would be able to achieve a gas-tight seal." 9 Bhatia had been
working as a machinist for several years before the policy's adoption. 2 °
Because a machinist's duties risked the potential exposure to toxic gases,
Chevron attempted to compel Bhatia to shave his facial hair to comply with
its safety regulation. 121 Subsequent to Bhatia's refusal to shave his beard,
Chevron terminated Bhatia from his position, even though requiring Bhatia
to comply with Chevron's request would have violated his religious beliefs.'
22
Instead, Chevron transferred Bhatia to a janitorial job that did not risk any
exposure to toxic gases.
123
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that Chevron had not
violated Title VII and found that retaining Bhatia as a machinist without any
guarantee that he could safely use a respirator would cause undue hardship to
Chevron. 24 First, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that retaining Bhatia as a
machinist could potentially expose the company to liability for violating the
safety standards promulgated by COSHA.125 Second, the court held that even
if Chevron continued to employ Bhatia as a machinist and only required him
to perform duties that would not expose him to toxic gases, Chevron would
still endure undue hardship because it would be forced to change its system
of duty assignments by shifting Bhatia's share of hazardous work to his co-
workers. 126 The court held that either of these scenarios would result in an
undue hardship on Chevron and, thus, denied Bhatia's claim.
127
Generally, cases that implicate public health or safety regulations have
predictable outcomes. Courts have consistently held that any accommodation
that requires employers to violate a state or business imposed health or safety
procedure constitutes an undue hardship.'28 At the same time, however,
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1384.
126. Id.
127. ld.
128. See, e.g., id. (holding that the defendant was not liable for religious discrimination when
operating in a manner consistent with California Occupational Safety and Health Administration
standards); Kalsi v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 62 F. Supp. 2d 745,756 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding
that the plaintiff, a Sikh, was unsuccessful when claiming religious discrimination under Title
VII after being fired for failing to wear a hard hat as required by a safety regulation in a subway
maintenance shop); EEOC v. Sambo's, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86, 91 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (stating that
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courts have consistently found Title VII violations when an employee can
show that they were either discharged or demoted because of overt
discrimination on the part of the employer. 1
29
B. Overt Religious Discrimination
A second framework for Title VII interpretation involves the situation
where employees are able to demonstrate that their employer discharged or
reprimanded them because of religious animus. When discrimination is
apparent because an employee's religious dress identifies that employee with
a minority religious group, courts have generally found that the employer has
violated Title VII. 3 Typically, these cases involve a neutral clothing or
grooming policy that has little, if any, connection to an employer's
business. 3 ' Moreover, it is not unusual for employers to selectively enforce
such policies. 3 2 In the usual case, after an employee has repeatedly expressed
religious objections to an employer, the employer discharges the employee
without any type of accommodation.' 33 Plaintiffs in these cases are often
successful because the religious discrimination is quite overt and
transparent.'34 Notably, in such instances, it is often the case that any
accommodation would not impose undue cost or hardship on the employer.
In EEOC v. Electronic Data Systems,'35 Dallaire, an employee, was
discharged because he refused to shave his beard, which violated corporate
policy. Dallaire believed that wearing a beard was required by his Jewish
faith.' 36 His employer's policy had no foundation in any health or safety
regulation, nor did his employer provide any means of reasonable
the restaurant was not required by Title VII to violate its own uniform grooming policy in
employing the plaintiff where hygiene was very important to the restaurant business).
129. See infra Part III.B.
130. See, e.g., Carter v. Bruce Oakley, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Ark. 1993); Karriem v.
Oliver T. Carr Co., No. 83-1922, 1985 WL 56660 (D.D.C. July 31, 1985); EEOC Decision No.
71-2620, 1971 WL 3957 (E.E.O.C. June 25, 1971); Khalsa v. Putnam County, No. 92-2499,
1993 WL 943428 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hrgs. Feb. 11, 1993).
131. See, e.g., Carter, 849 F. Supp. 673; Karriem, 1985 WL 56660; EEOC Decision No. 71-
2620, 1971 WL 3957; Khalsa, 1993 WL 943428.
132. Carter, 849 F. Supp. at 674 (involving employee who refused to cut beard); Karriem,
1985 WL 56660 (involving employee who wore religious pin); EEOC Decision No. 71-2620,
1971 WL 3957, at **2-3 (involving employee who wore religious dress); Khalsa, No. 92-2499,
1993 WL 943428, at **1-3 (same).
133. Carter, 849 F. Supp. at 676; Karriem, 1985 WL 56660; EEOC Decision No. 71-2620,
1971 WL 3957, at *3; Khalsa, 1993 WL 943428, at *6.
134. See, e.g., Carter, 849 F. Supp. 673; Karriem, 1985 WL 56660; EEOC Decision No. 71-
2620,1971 WL 3957; Khalsa, 1993 WL 943428.
135. No. C83-151C, 1983 WL 464 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 14, 1983).
136. Id. at *1.
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accommodation after it learned of Dallaire's reason for refusing to shave his
beard. 13 Furthermore, the record indicated that other employees who wore
beards because of their religious beliefs, such as Sikhs, were accommodated
by Dallaire's employer. 13' The company failed to provide a similar type of
accommodation to Dallaire.139 The court enjoined Dallaire's employer from
terminating him because of Dallaire's strong showing of probable success on
the merits and because other employees clearly had been accommodated
where they were similarly situated." °
In Karriem v. Oliver T. Carr Co.,14' Karriem, a Black Muslim security
guard, was fired for wearing a religious medal on his uniform.'42 Before his
termination, Karriem's supervisors had instructed him on several occasions
to stop wearing the religious pin on his uniform. 143 Karriem continued to
wear the pin while on duty, despite the company's employee manual that
provided that "no security officer shall wear or carry a metal or metallic
appearing badge."' 44 The court found that the purpose of the employment
regulation was to avoid confusion between the badges of security guards with
official law enforcement badges.145 After finding that Karriem' s religious pin
bore no resemblance to a police officer's badge, and thus the company's
policy objective was not implicated, the court held that Karriem was
dismissed solely because of his employer's resentment of his religion. 1
46
Courts have generally held that Title VII is violated in cases such as
Electronic Data Systems and Karriem. The transparency of the
discrimination involved in these cases, coupled with the reality that
accommodating the employees involved would cause little or no hardship to
the employers, has led courts consistently to find Title VII violations in cases
of such overt discrimination.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at *2.
141. No. 83-1922, 1985 WL 56660 (D.D.C. July 31, 1985).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. The court found that "the defendants engaged in practices of discrimination against
[Karriem] because of his race and religion; that the defendants were not justified in terminating
the plaintiff's employment[;] . . . that the reasons proffered at trial were pretextual[;
and] ... that the decision to fire him was retaliatory, excessive, and motivated by impermissive
factors." Id.
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C. Nonconformists: Individuals Requiring Special Treatment to the
Detriment of the Group
The most ideologically inconsistent area of the courts' Title VII reasonable
accommodation jurisprudence occurs when "the religious accommodation
requirement actively pits an individual against a group."' 47 This occurs when
employees define their unusual and unconventional religious accommodation
needs and then demand that their employers accommodate them.'48 Conflicts
result in these situations because the employee's religious practices generally
conflict with ordinary work practices.'49 Courts that use this model of Title
VU interpretation typically decide cases on "societal notions of how much
latitude the group must cede to the nonconformist," instead of the actual
standards set forth in Title VII. 5° Rather than determining the actual cost of
accommodation, courts simply analyze the potential detrimental effects on the
plaintiffs' fellow employees and co-workers that could arise if the employer
accommodated the plaintiff. 5' Consequently, this approach leads to a bias
favoring the group and ultimately the employer, as opposed to the employee
requesting accommodation.
5 2
For example, in Wilson v. U.S. West Communications,53 Wilson, a Roman
Catholic, was discharged when she missed three consecutive days of work
after her employer told her not to return to work wearing an anti-abortion
button depicting a fetus, which Wilson had made a religious oath to wear.
54
Notably, U.S. West did not have a dress code; however, the company claimed
Wilson's button became a source of disruption at work because employees
frequently gathered to discuss it."' Moreover, U.S. West argued that some
147. Silbiger, supra note 11, at 850.
148. Id.
149. Id. For example, these employees may be subject to their co-workers' ridicule or
contempt.
150. Id.
151. Id. For instance, if the issue was that the plaintiff was unable to work on the Sabbath,
rather than analyzing the actual cost of accommodation in rearranging the plaintiffs schedule,
the court would examine the possible effects the accommodation would have on the plaintiff's
co-workers.
152. Id.
153. 58 F.3d 1337 (8th Cir. 1995).
154. Id. at 1339-40. Wilson had previously made a religious vow that she would wear an
anti-abortion button until abortion was outlawed. Id. at 1339. The button had a diameter of two
inches and depicted a color picture of an eighteen-to-twenty-week-old fetus. Id. Wilson wore
the button at all times, save sleeping or bathing, because of her belief that if she "took off the
button she would compromise her vow and lose her soul." Id.
155. Id.
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employees threatened to quit because of the button, and many co-workers
testified "that they found the button offensive and disturbing."'' 56 Wilson's
supervisors met with her and offered her three alternatives to wearing the
button, none of which satisfied her religious obligations. 15 7 Ultimately,
Wilson's supervisor instructed her not to return to work wearing anything that
depicted a fetus. 58 U.S. West sent Wilson home when she came to work
wearing the button and later fired her for missing three consecutive unexcused
days of work.'59
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the trial court,
holding that Wilson had successfully shown a prima facie case of religious
discrimination under Title VII. 60 The court, however, also affirmed the trial
court's holding that requiring U.S. West to allow Wilson to wear her button
would create an undue hardship.' 61 In the course of her appeal, Wilson argued
that she had not caused the company to suffer any actual loss from
rearranging schedules or missing work. 162 Wilson further contended that the
problem was not her wearing of the button; rather, it was her co-workers
response to her decision to wear the button that caused disruption. 63 Wilson
suggested that U.S. West could simply have requested that her co-workers not
discuss the button during work hours.' 64 Wilson argued that such an
instruction would not constitute an undue hardship. 65 Both the Eighth Circuit
and the trial court summarily rejected Wilson's argument, holding that U.S.
West "was unable to persuade the co-workers to ignore the button[,
and] ... [t]o simply instruct Wilson's co-workers that they [had to] accept
Wilson's insistence on wearing a particular depiction of a fetus as part of her
religious beliefs [was] antithetical to the concept of reasonable
accommodation."' 66
Significantly, rather than determining the merit of Wilson's cause of action
based on Hardison's incredibly low de minimis hardship standard, the Eighth
156. Id.
157. Id. U.S. West provided the following three options to Wilson in an attempt to
accommodate her religious needs: (1) wear the button in her cubicle; (2) conceal the button
while she was at work; or (3) wear a different button that conveyed the same message but did
not have a photograph of a fetus. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1340.
160. Id. at 1340-41.
161. Id. at 1342.
162. Id. at 1341.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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Circuit rejected Wilson's argument and analyzed the case as a nonconformist
individual challenging the accepted standards of the group. 6 7 The court held
"that Title VII does not require an employer to allow an employee to impose
his religious views on others." 168 Instead of adequately balancing the rights
and duties of Wilson and her employer, the court elevated "the concerns of
grumbling colleagues above those of the aggrieved employee."' 169 The irony
inherent in the court's analysis is that Congress intended Title VII's
reasonable accommodation protection to serve as a safeguard for employees
with minority religious beliefs, despite the unpopularity or inconvenience it
causes fellow employees, unless the accommodation would cause an undue
hardship on the employer. 170 One central objective of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, which includes Title VII, was to protect rights of minorities "against the
potentially oppressive will of the majority."'17 ' The result in U.S. West was
precisely what Title VII intended to avoid. Congress had already achieved a
balance between the individual and the group, with the individual at all times
triumphant absent some undue hardship on the employers. 72 Clearly, the
Eighth Circuit's mode of analysis significantly undermines the benefits that
Congress intended Title VII to confer on religious minorities.'73
D. Religious Accommodation v. Religious Neutrality
In some instances, courts have been unwilling to require public employers
to accommodate the religious beliefs of an employee on the grounds that
doing so would create an implied endorsement of that religion, thus
destroying the appearance of religious neutrality. '7' Accordingly, even when
a plaintiff successfully proves a prima facie case of religious discrimination
167. Id. at 1342.
168. Id. It is interesting that the Eighth Circuit characterized Wilson's wearing of a button
as imposing her religious beliefs on others. Although she was expressing her religious beliefs
in an obvious and vivid manner, there is no indication that her personal religious beliefs were
imposed on her co-workers. This seems to be the only logical way the court could have
characterized the scenario without explicitly stating that the court was making a policyjudgment
favoring the status quo of the majority to the detriment of the individual needing
accommodation.
169. Silbiger, supra note 11, at 851.
170. Id. at 852-53.
171. Id. at 852.
172. Id. at 853.
173. Id.
174. See United States v. Bd. of Educ., 911 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1990) (Bd. of Educ. 1). For
a detailed discussion of the history of religious dress in public schools, see E. Edmund Reutter,
Jr., Teacher's Religious Dress: A Century of Litigation, 70 EDUc. L. REP. 747 (1992); for a
discussion of religious garb statutes' interplay with Title VII, see Holly M. Bastian, Comment,
Religious Garb Statutes and Title VII. An Uneasy Coexistence, 80 GEO. L.J. 211 (1991).
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against a public employer under Title VII, courts are reluctant to provide
relief because religious accommodation may create an undue hardship on
public employers by undermining the appearance of religious neutrality.'75
In United States v. Board of Education, 76 the Third Circuit held that an
1895 Pennsylvania statute, known as the Garb Statute, furthered the
compelling interest of preserving an atmosphere of religious neutrality in the
public school system. 77  As a result, the court reasoned that any
accommodation that undermined the compelling interest of religious
neutrality created an undue hardship on the school system.18 The statute in
question prohibited all public school teachers from wearing any symbol or
insignia that would identify a teacher as a member of any religious group. 1
79
Alima Reardon, a Muslim woman, was discharged from her position as a
substitute teacher for her religious dress in Board of Education.80 Reardon
had worked for the school district as a substitute and full-time teacher for
twelve years before embracing the religious belief that required her to alter
the manner in which she dressed. 18' Notably, Reardon taught in Muslim attire
for two years without any reprimands from her employer.182 In 1984,
however, on three separate occasions, Reardon's employer told her that she
would no longer be able to teach wearing her religious clothing.'83 In each
175. See Bd. of Educ. 1, 911 F.2d at 893.
176. 911 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1990).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 894.
179. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1112 (West 1992). The Garb Statute provides:
(a) That no teacher in any public school shall wear in said school or while
engaged in the performance of his duty as such teacher any dress, mark, emblem
or insignia indicating the fact that such teacher is a member or adherent of any
religious order, sect or denomination.
(b) Any teacher employed in any of the public schools of this Commonwealth,
who violates the provisions of this section, shall be suspended from employment
in such school for the term of one year, and in case of a second offense by the
same teacher he shall be permanently disqualified from teaching in said school.
Any public school director who after notice of any such violation fails to comply
with the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon
conviction of the first offense, shall be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding one
hundred dollars ($100), and on conviction of a second offense, the offending
school director shall be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars
($100) and shall be deprived of his office as a public school director.
Id.
180. Bd. of Educ. 1, 911 F.2d at 884 (noting that her religious dress included a scarf that
covered her hair, ears, and neck, and a long, loose dress which covered her arms to her wrist).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 884-85.
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instance, Reardon was given the opportunity to leave work and return without
wearing her religious dress; however, the school district prohibited her from
teaching when she refused to comply.'84 Reardon initially filed a complaint
with the EEOC.'85 When attempts at conciliation failed, the EEOC referred
the matter to the Department of Justice, which then filed the complaint in
district court. 1
8 6
1. Round One: The District Court Decision
After Reardon proved a prima facie case of religious discrimination, the
district court found that the school board failed to present any evidence of
accommodation."8 7  The court rejected the school board's first
argument - that a violation of the Garb Statute could potentially result in
criminal liability, thus creating an undue hardship - because no such
criminal prosecution had ever been pursued since the statute's inception.1
88
Furthermore, the school board's argument was logically inconsistent because
it had permitted teachers, including Reardon, to wear religious garb in the past
without any consequences.8 9
The school board also argued that allowing Reardon to teach in religious
dress would sacrifice the public employer's "compelling interest in avoiding
the actual or symbolic endorsement of religion by the public schools."'" The
court, however, rejected this argument, holding that the school board failed
to provide sufficient evidence to show that Reardon's religious dress would
cause students to believe that the school district had endorsed Islam. 9'
Moreover, the district court rejected the school board's third argument that
accommodating Reardon would result in a violation of the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment.'92 In its Establishment Clause analysis, the
court applied the tripartite test introduced in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 93 First, the
184. Id. at 885.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. United States v. Bd. of Educ., No. 87-2842, 1989 WL52506, at *13 (E.D. Pa. May 17,
1989) (Bd. of Educ. II). The school board had to prove that any accommodation would have
created an undue hardship, and therefore the school board was unable to reasonably
accommodate Reardon. Id.
188. Id. at *14; see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1112(b) (West 1992).
189. Bd. of Educ. II, 1989 WL 52506, at *14.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at *15.
193. 403 U.S. 602 (1972). "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second,
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally,
the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion."' Id. at 612-13
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court found that allowing Reardon to continue to teach wearing her religious
garb in order to comply with Title VII constituted a secular legislative
purpose.'94 Second, the court held that the school board would not advance
or inhibit religion by its mere acquiescence to Reardon's desire to wear
religious attire.'95 Finally, the court found that allowing Reardon to teach
wearing her religious attire would not create an excessive government
entanglement with religion. 196 To the contrary, requiring teachers to abstain
from wearing any religious garb or symbol would result in continual
evaluation and surveillance of religious activity.'97
The district court then awarded compensatory damages to Reardon in the
form of back pay and enjoined the school district from further enforcement
of the Pennsylvania Garb Statute on the grounds that it was inconsistent with
Title VII.' 98 The district court's analytical framework correctly applied Title
VIl's burden on employers to reasonably accommodate absent undue
hardship.'99 Unfortunately, the court's holding and rationale were erroneously
overturned on appeal.2°°
2. Round Two: The Third Circuit's Decision
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district court's
holding that Title VII prohibited the enforcement of any religious garb statute,
finding that accommodating Reardon would pose an undue hardship on the
school board.20 1 The court based its holding on both the potential exposure
of the school board to criminal liability for violating the Pennsylvania statute
and the compelling need to preserve an atmosphere of religious neutrality in
the public school system.
2 2
The court relied heavily on Cooper v. Eugene School District No.4j 203 to
justify its rationale that accommodating Reardon would cause the school
(internal citation omitted).
194. Bd. of Educ. II, 1989 WL 52506, at *15.
195. Id. at **16-17.
196. Id. at *16.
197. Id.
198. Id. at *20.
199. Pennsylvania district courts also held for plaintiffs, either on Title VII or First
Amendment grounds, in two related cases where an employee was discharged because of
religious garb or symbolism. See Nichol v. ARIN Intermediate Unit 28, 268 F. Supp. 2d 536
(2003); EEOC v. Reads, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1150 (1991).
200. United States v. Bd. of Educ., 911 F.2d 882, 894 (3d Cir. 1990) (Bd. of Educ. i).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 890-91.
203. 723 P.2d 298 (Or. 1986), appeal dismissed, 480 U.S. 942 (1987).
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board to sacrifice the compelling interest of religious neutrality.2°  Cooper
involved nearly indistinguishable facts; however, in that case, the Oregon
Supreme Court analyzed only the First Amendment Free Exercise claim and
ignored the Title VII religious discrimination claim.20 5 Cooper held that the
compelling state interest of religious neutrality superceded the First
Amendment's Free Exercise Clause.20 6 After discussing Cooper, the Third
Circuit held that "it necessarily follow[ed] ... that the Oregon statutes [did]
not violate Title VII.
' 20 7
The Third Circuit followed the reasoning and analysis of the fourth
framework of jurisprudence concerning Title VII in the context of public
employment. 28 Rather than correctly applying Title VII, the Third Circuit
sidestepped the opportunity to formulate any accommodation standards by
allowing a perceived noneconomic need for neutrality to suffice as a
compelling government interest. Ultimately, the court found that any
deviation from the appearance of neutrality would automatically constitute an
undue hardship. 209 The court did not provide any substantive relief or
204. Bd. of Educ. I, 991 F.2d at 887-89.
205. Cooper, 723 P.2d at 313.
206. Id.
207. Bd. of Educ. I, 911 F.2d at 890. As noted by the concurrence, Cooper expressly
declined to review the Title VII issue raised by the Plaintiff. "[I]n essence, the majority states
that while Cooper did not speak directly to Title VII, the reasoning in Cooper imports that Title
VII would not be violated by the Garb Statute." Id. at 897. (Ackerman, J., concurring). The
Third Circuit's reliance on Cooper is problematic for two reasons: (1) the Oregon Supreme
Court did not address the Title VII claim at all; it merely evaluated whether the statute served
a compelling interest; and (2) the Oregon Supreme Court's decision was based largely on state
constitutional interpretation, rather than the U.S. Constitution, which would be far more relevant
in Board of Education.
208. Id.
209. Id. Perhaps what is more significant in this case is the Eighth Circuit's selective
application of the First Amendment. Rather than emphasizing the freedom of Reardon to
exercise her religion, the court prevented her from expressing her religious beliefs on the
grounds that her appearance alone would make the school district seem as if it was endorsing
a particular religion. Id. The court's rationale is logically inconsistent. While the court states
that "the offending dress is dress that communicates to the teacher's students adherence to a
religion, noting that this would not include dress that communicates an ambiguous message,
such as, for example, the occasional wearing ofjewelry that incorporates decorations like a cross
or a Star of David," id. at 80, the court fails to acknowledge that a cross is the universal symbol
for Christianity, just as the Star of David is for Judaism. The only distinction being made is the
frequency with which the symbol is worn. Under the court's rationale, differentiating the
symbols based on the number of times it is worn would be illogical. If the symbol in question
would show an absence of neutrality when worn, then it should not be worn, even one time.
The repeated logical inconsistencies in the courts' rationale illustrate the incredible flaws in the
underlying analysis. Ultimately, the Third Circuit simply did not want to impose upon the
school district the duty to reasonably accommodate Reardon, even where the financial cost
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accommodation to Reardon or similarly situated individuals.21 °
Courts employing this framework fail to place any meaningful burden on
employers to reasonably accommodate the religious beliefs of employees. In
these cases, courts have somehow managed to turn Title VII on its head by
construing a statute that requires employers to account for religious pluralism
by accommodating their employees as calling for a facially neutral religious
atmosphere devoid of any religious expression.211 Title VII unequivocally
sought to avoid this exact form of discrimination.21 2 Using the First
Amendment or the need for the appearance of neutrality as a tool to avoid
enforcement of Title VII's religious accommodation provision is simply
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding the
Establishment Clause. 213  A more coherent and consistent analytical
framework should be applied to Title VII cases. Such a framework should
adequately balance the competing interests of employees and employers.
E. Religious Interests Balanced With Business Necessity
Balancing the religious interests of employees with employers' business
necessity concerns is the only framework that truly reflects the actual
language of section 701(j). 214  Furthermore, this model's predictable
framework simultaneously provides consistency and flexibility.15 Under this
model, courts analyze Title VII cases as falling somewhere on a continuum,
with one end requiring reasonable accommodation and the other end
constituting undue hardship.216 Courts may use various factors to determine
would have been insignificant.
210. As the district court noted, there was no evidence presented at trial that indicated a
probability, or even a possibility, that Reardon's head-scarf would create a "perception by
students that the school or local governmental entity endorsed the teacher's religion." Bd. of
Educ. II, 1989 WL 52506, at **14-15.
211. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
212. Id.
213. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). The Supreme Court explicitly stated:
In our modern, complex society, whose traditions and constitutional
underpinnings rest on and encourage diversity and pluralism in all areas, an
absolutist approach in applying the Establishment Clause is simplistic and has
been uniformly rejected by the Court. Rather than mechanically invalidating all
governmental conduct or statutes that confer benefits or give special recognition
to religion in general or to one faith - as an absolutist approach would
dictate - the court has scrutinized legislation or official conduct to determine
whether, in reality, it establishes a religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.
Id. at 1361-62.
214. Silbiger, supra note 11, at 857.
215. Id.
216. The weight of the individual's religious interest and belief, provided it is proved to be
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what part of the continuum the case falls on, and thus, what level of
accommodation, if any, is required.21 7 Courts mainly consider "the
individual's statutory right to exercise religion freely... balanced against the
employer's statutory right to be free of accommodation requirements that
unduly burden its business." '218 Because the business hardship variable is
significant, it is evaluated using a two-pronged analysis: (1) the court must
consider the proven financial cost to the employer, and not merely speculative
or hypothetical costs, and (2) the court must evaluate the reasonableness of
the accommodation by determining how well the employer can bear the
costs.
2 19
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit articulated this method
of analysis in Brown v. General Motors Corp.22° when it stated that
[u]nless the statutory mandate (which requires reasonable
accommodation) is to be rendered meaningless, it must be held to
provide that until facts or circumstances arise from which it may
be concluded that there can no longer be an accommodation
without undue hardship, the employee's religious practices are
required to be tolerated.22'
This approach requires courts to analyze actual costs to evaluate the
reasonableness of the accommodation sought by the employee.222 After the
employee has made a prima facie showing of religious discrimination, the
employer must affirmatively prove that reasonable accommodation would
create an undue hardship on the business, using actual, rather than speculative
or hypothetical, CoStS. 223 By relying on the existence of an actual hardship to
the employer instead of hypothetical hardship, this framework gives teeth to
Title VII's reasonable accommodation provision.224 Moreover, balancing
each interest and placing the outcome somewhere along the accommodation-
hardship continuum provides a greater degree of consistency and certainty to
Title VIl's prohibition of religious discrimination.
sincere, is constant and would not shift the case along the continuum toward or away from either
reasonable accommodation or undue hardship. Id.
217. See, e.g., Brown v. Gen. Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956 (8th Cir. 1979). Courts would
have to evaluate the specific factual allegations underlying the case in determining the relevant
costs.
218. Silbiger, supra note 11, at 857.
219. Id. at 858-59.
220. 601 F.2d 956 (8th Cir. 1979).
221. Id. at 961.
222. Silbiger, supra note 11, at 859.
223. Id.
224. Id.
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By using this framework to analyze the cases previously discussed, both the
consistency and flexibility of the model are readily apparent. For example,
in Sambo's, if the employer proved the existence of an actual significant cost
that would result from employing individuals with beards, such as lost sales
or revenue, the case would shift toward undue hardship, and the employer
would not be liable for discrimination. 5 In contrast, if there was only a
hypothetical cost established, or if the actual cost was insignificant, Title VII
would require an employer to reasonably accommodate its employees. 26
Bhatia would clearly fall on the undue hardship side of the continuum
because accommodating the employee would cause the employer to violate
California law, which could subject the employer to civil and criminal
penalties. 227  Title VII does not require an employer to suffer such a
hardship. 228 Therefore, Bhatia's holding would remain undisturbed under this
framework. Similarly, the decisions in both Karriem and Electronic Data
Systems would remain unaltered because in both cases the employers could
not prove any actual hardship that arose from accommodating the plaintiffs.229
Thus, both cases would fall along the reasonable accommodation portion of
the continuum.
Before applying the continuum analysis in Wilson, the court would have to
evaluate the potential for actual hardship in terms of decreases in productivity
and minor losses in revenue. 230 However, because the employer failed to
adequately illustrate that this type of hardship would occur if Wilson
continued to wear her anti-abortion pin, the case would likely fall on the
reasonable accommodation end of the continuum. Notably, this analysis
would result in a different outcome than the one provided by the Wilson
court.
23 1
Additionally, this framework would have required the employer to
reasonably accommodate Reardon in Board of Education because the
employer almost entirely relied on hypothetical hardships that were not
225. EEOC v. Sambo's Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86, 92 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
226. Although it may seem as though noneconomic loss would not be taken into
consideration within this framework, if the employer can prove that they will actually suffer
some intangible loss if it accommodates an employee, courts can use the noneconomic loss as
a factor within the analysis.
227. Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382, 1384 (9th Cir. 1984).
228. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e) (2003).
229. See Karriem v. Oliver T. Carr Co., No. 83-1922, 1985 WL 56660 (D.D.C. July 31,
1985); EEOC v. Elec. Data Sys., No. C83-151C, 1983 WL 464 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 14, 1983).
230. See Wilson v. U.S. West Communications, 58 F.3d 1337, 1342 (8th Cir. 1995).
231. Id.
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substantiated by any evidence.232 Accordingly, this case would have been
decided in favor of the plaintiff.
The reasonable accommodation-undue hardship continuum provides a
framework which, if used by courts, would provide a consistent standard in
interpreting religious discrimination cases under Title VII. Although
variables will inevitably continue to exist because of factual variations, the
continuum still provides more objective standards than those that currently
exist. As a result, judicial discretion will be significantly constrained and
mainly relegated to borderline cases.
IV. Conclusion
Title Vil's objective is to eliminate employment discrimination on the basis
of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.233 Title VII's impact,
however, has been severely constrained by the U.S. Supreme Court's narrow
interpretation of the scope of an employer's duty to accommodate.2 4 Courts
have further minimized the effects and purpose of Title VII by inconsistently
applying and interpreting employees' rights and employers' duties. To limit
this type of inconsistency, courts must begin implementing a method of
analysis that balances accommodation with business necessity, which will
ultimately provide a more certain legal landscape.
Huma T. Yunus
232. United States v. Bd. of Educ., 911 F.2d 882, 896 (3d Cir. 1990) (Ackerman, J.,
concurring) (Bd. of Educ. 1).
233. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
234. See, e.g., Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986); Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
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